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MENTAL AUTOMATISM TO LACAN’S THEORY
OF THE PSYCHOTIC STRUCTURE
Stijn Vanheule, Ghent, Belgium
Lacan and His Only Master
In 1966, as he published his Écrits, Lacan added several new short pieces to his
collection of highly influential psychoanalytic writings. One of the new short
papers was ‘On My Antecedents’ (Lacan, 1966). In this remarkable text Lacan
reflected on diverse authorities that had been guiding him in the development
of his work, including Melanie Klein and Salvador Dalí. Others, like Alexandre
Kojève and Henri Wallon – who certainly had an important impact concerning
the themes Lacan refers to – were not mentioned (Roudinesco, 1993), and
Claude Lévi-Strauss – who opened the path towards his structural approach to
psychoanalysis – is only briefly mentioned in a footnote. The two most prominent
influences that he points to are Sigmund Freud and Gaëtan Gatian de Clérambault.
The reference to Freud is not surprising. After all, in the early 1950s Lacan
organized his public Seminar in terms of a ‘retour à Freud.’ The reference to
de Clérambault is more surprising, not so much because he had not mentioned
him before (see e.g. Lacan, 1947, 1993), but because he gives de Clérambault
a prominent place with regard to his doctoral thesis (Lacan, 1975[1932]) and
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makes a clear link between de Clérambault’s concept of ‘mental automatism’ and
his own structural clinical approach:
As a physician and a psychiatrist, I had introduced, under the heading of ‘paranoiac
knowledge,’ several end results of the method of clinical exhaustion that my doctoral
thesis in medicine exemplified […] It stems from the work of Gatian de Clérambault, my
only master in psychiatry. His notion of ‘mental automatism,’ with its metaphorical,
mechanistic ideology, which is assuredly open to criticism, seems to me, in its attempt to
come to grips with the [patient’s] subjective text, closer to what can be constructed on the
basis of a structural analysis than any other clinical approach in French psychiatry.
(Lacan, 1966, p. 65)
In this quote, two things stand out in particular. On the one hand, Lacan
makes a clear link between his own concept of ‘paranoiac knowledge’ and
de Clérambault’s concept of ‘mental automatism,’ and on the other hand, he
closely connects the latter with his structural approach to psychoanalysis.
Indeed, as he indicates, in his doctoral thesis Lacan (1975[1932]) elaborated
a novel approach to psychosis, which postulated a dual imaginary relation between
a patient and his world at the basis of paranoia. This dual imaginary relation is
rooted in an identificatory process in which the ego is captured by ideal images:
Images from without invade the patient’s mind, thus installing an experience
of intrusion that gives rise to unshakeable convictions (Vanheule, 2011).
Lacan (1975[1932], p. 337) first qualifies these convictions as ‘delusional
knowledge’ – connaissance délirante – but later refers to them with the term
‘paranoid knowledge’ (e.g. Lacan, 1947, 1949). In ‘On My Antecedents’ Lacan
justifiably linked his concept of ‘paranoid knowledge’ to de Clérambault’s work
on ‘mental automatism.’ After all, in both cases a psychological experience of
intrusion is situated at the basis of psychosis. Yet, in the dissertation itself,
references to de Clérambault are scarce, and no link at all is made between mental
automatism and delusional knowledge (Maleval, 2001). It is therefore relevant
to clarify why Lacan at first neglected to note the obvious connection between
these concepts.
Second, in the above quote from ‘On My Antecedents’ Lacan suggests a close
connection between his own structural approach to psychoanalysis and
de Clérambault’s theory of mental automatism. This is quite a statement, given
the fact that de Clérambault’s approach is grounded in biological and mechanical
determinism, while in his structural work from the 1950s Lacan’s focus is on the
unconscious and on language. Therefore, the proposed link between mental
automatism and Lacan’s structural approach needs to be studied in detail, focusing
on how their viewpoints converge and diverge. Early on in this work Lacan (1988
[1931]) used the concept of structure in relation to psychosis. At that time
he referred to specific dynamics in subcategories of psychosis, which is quite in
line with de Clérambault’s work (Roudinesco, 1994). Yet, from the 1950s on,
when Lacan was inspired by structuralist thinking, ‘structure’ obtained a different
meaning, and now concerned the language-based functioning of the unconscious,
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giving a new twist to his use of the mental automatism concept (Haustgen &
Gumpper, 2012).
In this article I will first discuss de Clérambault’s work, focusing on his concept
of mental automatism. Subsequently I review the roots of the divergences between
both authors, and finally I examine how mental automatism might be situated in
Lacan’s structural account of psychosis. As Lacan himself did not elaborate this
link, I provide an interpretation as to how mental automatism fits within the
Lacanian model.
On de Clérambault
Gaëtan Gatian de Clérambault (1872–1934) was a medical doctor working in the
tradition of the French alienists. From 1905 onwards he worked at the Special
Infirmary for the Insane of the Paris Prefecture of Police, which he led between
1920 and 1934. This small-scale service consisted of 18 cells, where people
deemed potentially insane were locked up following police arrest in order that they
could undergo psychiatric examination (Rubens, 1998). Detainees stayed only for
brief periods and were screened for mental illness. On average, 2,500–3,000
persons per year underwent psychiatric examination in this service (Rubens,
1998). De Clérambault was well-known for his thorough but rapid clinical
decision-making (Michaux, 1973), which had a specific focus: ‘it [the certificate
that de Clérambault wrote] is not so much concerned with labeling a disease entity,
but with bringing to light, in a couple of lines and with some well-chosen words,
the flamboyance of the symptom’ (Rubens, 1998, p. 160). It has been estimated
that he wrote between 13,000 and 15,000 certificates during his career (Gumpper
& Haustgen, 2012; Hriso, 2002). Related to his diagnostic work de Clérambault
also occupied a teaching role at the Special Infirmary for the Insane, mainly
consisting of public clinical presentations where he interviewed and discussed
selected cases from his department.
In 1928–9 Lacan completed an internship at the Special Infirmary, supervised
by de Clérambault (Roudinesco, 1993; Rubens, 1998). Like several others
(e.g. Ey, 1952) he praised de Clérambault’s diagnostic interview skills and talent
for clinical deduction (Lacan, 1947). By many, de Clérambault is remembered as
a clever examiner who managed to get in touch with patients’ preoccupations very
quickly and very skillfully:
In the maneuver of stirring the patient to the point of withdrawing his secret the alienist
[de Clérambault] speaks all languages, apes all styles, and mobilizes all registers of
speech. His ability to mimic, which aims at trapping his ‘client,’ is really fascinating.
(Rubens, 1998, p. 157)1
1. Unless otherwise noted, all translations from previously untranslated French texts are my own.
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Indeed, often de Clérambault is recalled for the subtle attention he paid to discreet
details in patients’ stories and speech that might be indicative of a psychotic
condition (Rubens, 1998). The crucial process that he focused on was mental
automatism.
Yet some authors were more disparaging of his work. From the 1920s onwards
André Breton was critical of de Clérambault’s harsh practices (Roudinesco, 1994).
As Leguil (2002, pp. 29–32) indicates, Lacan (1975[1932]), too, was critical
of aspects of de Clérambault’s work at the Special Infirmary, especially the
interrogatory style of de Clérambault’s interviewing: through his position as
‘expert’ he tended to coerce confessions from patients about specific symptoms,
and by doing so he failed to really listen to his patients. He avoided the subjective
encounter with people arriving in crisis at this service, and hid behind objectifying
schemes and ideas (Gumpper & Haustgen, 2012). Nowadays criticism continues
to be made about de Clérambault’s psychiatric practice. For example, at one point
he wrote a mental report about the French painter Maurice Utrillo, who suffered
from severe alcoholism and had traits of schizophrenia. The report contains several
factual errors, and has been described as incomplete and superficial (Biéder &
Bénézech, 2016).
Mental Automatism
Starting with a short paper in 1909, de Clérambault proceeded to author several
papers on the topic of mental automatism across the duration of his career. These
articles were quite influential. In 1927 the Aliénistes et Neurologistes de France
devoted their 31st conference to this concept, bearing witness to the impact of de
Clérambault’s work.
De Clérambault’s first detailed discussion of mental automatism stems from
1920, and this was further elaborated through several papers of that decade
(de Clérambault, 1920a, 1920b, 1923, 1924a, 1924b, 1925, 1926, 1927a, 1927b).
In 1925 he defined it as ‘a certain clinical syndrome consisting of automatic
phenomena in three registers: motor, sensory, and ideo-verbal’ (de Clérambault,
1925, p. 528), with ‘automatic phenomena’ referring to the surprising occurrence
of strange manifestations in the intimacy of one’s body and/or mind. The person
having such experiences does not feel that they belong to him. On the contrary,
within a certain register of functioning (motor, sensory, and ideo-verbal) parasitic
elements present themselves, to which the person feels passively subjected.
De Clérambault qualifies this as an experience of disappropriation and
interference, indicating that ownership in relation to the events taking place
internally is missing (de Clérambault, 1926, pp. 546, 549). Likewise, given
the spontaneous nature and the mechanical expansion of the events, they initially
have a surprising effect on the individual. Both affectively and thematically
speaking the experience is quite neutral or ‘non-ideational.’ What comes to
the fore is bewilderment and perplexity associated with ruptures in the process
of ideation, resulting in a failure to make sense of what is happening
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(de Clérambault, 1925, pp. 542–3). Such bewilderment is not a result of the mental
contents that a person is confronted with, but of a fundamental disruption in
the formal structure of normal experience: ‘Mental automatism as such does
not entail hostility. At first, the constituent phenomena are neutral at the affective
level and non-thematic at the ideational level’ (de Clérambault, 1923, p. 490).
Indeed, de Clérambault considers mental automatism as a comprehensive
nuclear process underlying many forms of madness (de Clérambault, 1920a,
1926): ‘This syndrome encompasses all types of hallucinations that we already
know; however, the mental automatism concept is more comprehensive than
the concept of hallucination’ (de Clérambault, 1925, p. 528). While including
hallucinations, mental automatism refers to a general process of interference at
the level of motor, sensory-affective, or ideo-verbal functioning, which can
already be observed in prodromal psychotic states (de Clérambault, 1923, 1926).
Non-hallucinatory mental automatism usually precedes the occurrence of
hallucinations, but both might coexist (de Clérambault, 1924a).
Within the general process of interference, de Clérambault discerned both
positive and negative automatic phenomena. In other words, automatism can be
expressed in terms of novel elements being added to one’s functioning (positive
mental automatism), or in terms of the decay of elements that habitually contribute
to functions (negative mental automatism). The first make up phenomena of
intrusion, and the Latter phenomena of inhibition (de Clérambault, 1924b, 1926).
Table 1 gives an overview of specific clinical manifestations that de Clérambault
presented as indicative of positive and negative automatic phenomena in motor,
sensory-affective, or ideo-verbal functioning (see also Renard, 1992).2
Throughout his oeuvre, de Clérambault (e.g. 1924b, 1926) frequently
distinguished minor automatism (petit automatisme) from major automatism
(grand automatisme). Minor automatism refers to subtle positive and negative
ideo-verbal phenomena that have not yet had a bewildering impact on a person’s
subjective functioning. Often they are hardly noticed; they are ‘anideatic,’
meaning that they have no specific content; and are affectively neutral. Major
automatism means that sensory-affective and motor functioning are also
involved, and that gross automatic phenomena, including ideo-verbal, disrupt
the person’s functioning. This renders the patient both perplexed and
overwhelmed. Often minor automatism is followed by major automatism, but
this is not always the case. Thought echoes frequently appear in the transition
between these experiences (Lanteri-Laura & Daumézon, 1961).
What is characteristic of de Clérambault’s approach is that although he adhered
closely to patient-materials and clinical observations, he did not elaborate
2. As can be deduced from the list in Table 1, the exact meaning of the mental automatism
concept somewhat shifted as de Clérambault’s work progressed. At first it refers to disruptions at
the ideo-verbal level in particular. Later on motor and sensory phenomena are included in the
concept, and in his later writings, affective disturbances are included as well.
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Table 1. List of specific clinical manifestations that bear witness to mental
automatism.
Positive phenomena at the level of ideo-verbal functioning
–Automatic thought: surprising thoughts of which one is not the originator occur in the mind
(de Clérambault, 1920a)*
– Thought control: the mind is influenced and directed by an external agent (de Clérambault,
1920a)
– Thought echoes: thoughts are heard in a repetitive way, as coming from without
(de Clérambault, 1920a)
– Confusion and distraction due to indeterminable thoughts (de Clérambault, 1920a)
– Outstripped thought: thoughts occur in the mind before the individual qua thinker could
have produced them (de Clérambault, 1923)
– Primitive pre-logical thinking: thought is preoccupied by playing with numbers, syllables,
colors, rhythm in speech, repetitions, making gross analogies (de Clérambault, 1923)
– Fragmented thought (de Clérambault, 1924b)
– False recognition (de Clérambault, 1924b)
– Substitution of thought: ongoing thought processes are disturbed by imposed thoughts
(de Clérambault, 1924b)
– Aprosexia: thought is too fast, there is an inability to focus attention on it (de Clérambault,
1924b)
– Estrangement: common objects and people are suddenly experienced as strange
(de Clérambault, 1926)
Negative phenomena at the level of ideo-verbal functioning
– Stops and blanks in thought processes (de Clérambault, 1924b)
– Disappearance of thoughts (de Clérambault, 1924b)
– Perplexities without an object (de Clérambault, 1926)
Positive phenomena at the level of motor functioning
– Experience of being forced and directed at the level of one’s actions (de Clérambault,
1920a)
– Automatic writing: writing down things beyond conscious control (de Clérambault, 1920a)
– Strange motor impulses (de Clérambault, 1924b)
Negative phenomena at the level of motor functioning
– Motor inhibitions (de Clérambault, 1924b)
Positive phenomena at the level of sensory-affective functioning
– Cenesthetic disturbance or cenestopathy: strange sensations that might be pleasurable or
disagreeable, and manifest across the body or in specific areas (de Clérambault, 1920a)
– Strange sensory perceptions, like at the olfactory level (de Clérambault, 1923)
– Automatic quasi-visual perception of memories (de Clérambault, 1924b)
– Dysesthesia: abnormal sense of touch involving painful sensations, like needles or electric
currents (de Clérambault, 1926)
– Sudden affective states, such as sadness, anxiety, joy, or anger, experienced as inappropriate
(de Clérambault, 1924b)
– Estranging obsessional fears and impulses occupy the mind (de Clérambault, 1924b)
– Emotions without an object (de Clérambault, 1926)
Negative phenomena at the level of sensory-affective functioning
– Sudden fatigue (de Clérambault, 1924b)
*I only include one key reference for each automatic phenomenon de Clérambault describes.
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a broader descriptive diagnostic system focusing on particular symptoms of
psychosis – such as hallucinations and delusions. What interested him was mental
automatism qua fundamental mechanism at the basis of all kinds of insanity or
psychosis. Moreover, while descriptive diagnostic approaches aim to reveal the
overall clinical picture of diverse psychotic conditions, de Clérambault assumed
that not all symptoms were of equal importance. Throughout his work he aimed
to grasp the elementary building block that defined whether a condition was
psychotic or not. Starting from his theory, patients with hallucinatory experiences,
but without automatic phenomena, were not thought of as psychotic. Conversely,
patients afflicted with automatic phenomena but without descriptive symptoms
like hallucinations and delusions were indeed psychotic.
In elaborating his theory of mental automatism, de Clérambault formulated
a descriptive framework that was theoretically unsophisticated. The main sources
he relied on were works of predecessors in the field of French psychiatry.
As de Clérambault (1923, 1924a) himself indicated, his concept of mental
automatism strongly builds on Jules Baillarger’s (1856) ideas about thought
echoes and psychic hallucination, which concern the experience of imposed
thoughts. Another important source for de Clérambault was Jules Séglas’s (1888)
work on verbal psychomotor hallucinations, which deals with the experience of
imposed speech (Gumpper & Haustgen, 2012; Lanteri-Laura, 2004; Lanteri-Laura
& Daumézon, 1961). What is unique to the clinical syndrome that de Clérambault
described is that he grouped the latter with an extensive list of other intrusive
phenomena that have a similar effect on the patient. In terms of subtypes
of psychosis, de Clérambault linked mental automatism to different types
of paranoia, hypochondria, mania, melancholia, and hallucinatory psychoses
(de Clérambault, 1923, 1924a, 1925; Renard, 1992). However, he used a unified
concept of psychosis (Hriso, 2002), as evident in his suggestion that similar
automatic phenomena can give rise to different kinds of delusions. For example,
cenesthetic sensations might just as well give rise to hypochondria as to delusions
with a mystical or persecutory content (de Clérambault, 1925).
Key to his work is the assumption of a strict parallel between mental
automatism, as observed clinically, and underlying neurological disruptions that
cause the automatic phenomena.3 De Clérambault was a strict organicist thinker,
and supposed that mental automatism was the negative reaction to infection,
intoxication, or tumors. Given the fact that automatism itself obeys a mechanistic
logic, and usually evolves in the same patterned way, he assumed that the origin
had to be mechanical in nature too, rather than being rooted in psychological
conflict, for example (de Clérambault, 1926). Psychological explanations were
very implausible to him, and he simply set them aside (de Clérambault, 1927).
Nevertheless, de Clérambault did not appear to be very interested in the issue of
3. In articulating these speculative causal links he clearly stuck to mental automatism as such,
meaning that he did not link his causal account to the pathogeny of psychosis (Hriso, 2002).
STIJN VANHEULE 211
causation (Leguil, 2002). Indeed, the concept of ‘mechanism’ might even have
played a purely metaphorical role (Miller, 1978).
In line with his idea that mental automatism constitutes the key mechanism of
psychosis, further symptoms, like delusions, were seen as secondary reactions:
‘the actual delusion is nothing but the obligatory reaction of a reasoning intellect,
which is often intact, to phenomena arising from sub-consciousness.’ Delusions
are elaborations of automatic phenomena that overwhelm and disturb the
individual: ‘it is the intensity, the unexpected character, the constancy, and the
strangeness of the sensation that prompts the subject […] to incline towards
exogenous explication’ (de Clérambault, 1925, p. 533). Indeed, delusional
interpretations are ideational responses that might, eventually, give rise to the
elaboration of a ‘second,’ delusional personality (de Clérambault, 1927). Between
the occurrence of automatic phenomena and the elaboration of a delusion,
a so-called incubation period might occur, during which, in a discreet way, the
initial experience of intrusion gradually invades the patient’s broader mental
life. What is characteristic of such an incubation period is confusion because
of contradicting thoughts and experiences: ‘an unexpected image arises, and
provokes an irrefutable thought; then it becomes haunting, provoking several
contradictory thoughts’ (de Clérambault, 1923, p. 481).
De Clérambault Questioned
While de Clérambault provided clear descriptions of mental automatism, his
reflections on the link between automatic phenomena and delusions left several
questions open.
First, while he claimed that delusions were interpretations derived from
automatic intrusions, the demarcation between both was not so clear. For
example, in several clinical cases he presented fragments like the following,
which he interpreted as indicative of automatism:
‘They know all about my life. They spend their time watching and saying everything.
They would say everything in front of my friend, that’s why we didn’t marry’ […]
‘They give me fears. They suggest that I yell at the killer in the street so that I will be
arrested as an insane. They force me to complain. Occasionally I wanted to complain
about someone, and then I didn’t want it anymore, but I was forced into doing so.’
(de Clérambault, 1924b, p. 519)
In contrast to the overall idea that mental automatism is affectively neutral, and
athematic or ‘non-ideational,’ these fragments bear witness not just to intrusion,
but also to manipulation by an external force, ‘they,’ which is not neutral, but
malevolent in nature. Obviously, automatism and delusion might intermingle.
On this point Lacan’s solution, explored some decades later in his Seminar
on the psychoses, is interesting. Contradicting de Clérambault, he suggested that
delusions should be seen not so much as ideational deductions or interpretations,
but as variations on the same problem. At first sight delusions seem more
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complicated, but in the end they articulate the same elementary structure of
interruption. In delineating both he suggests that the delusion starts as soon as an
‘inmixing of subjects’ is at stake (Lacan, 1993, p. 193): ‘It’s this that is constantly
involved in delusion: One makes them do this’ (Lacan, 1993, p. 194). For Lacan,
mental automatism refers to the passive experience of subjective changes, while
delusion implies that such alterations are attributed to external control, which
defines the subject as a pawn or puppet in the hands of a manipulative other.
Indeed, automatic phenomena make up ‘a parasitic point’ in the intimacy of mental
life, and delusions further articulate this basic structure (Lacan, 1993, p. 19;
Maleval, 2001).
In making this claim that delusions are not deduced from expressions of mental
automatism, one sees evidence of the impact Salvador Dalí’s work had on Lacan in
the 1930s. Early on Dalí formulated the idea that automatism had an important role
to play in the production of paranoid knowledge (Roudinesco, 1994; Garrabé,
2005). Already in his paper ‘The Rotting Donkey,’ Dalí (1930a) suggested that
delusions do not emerge as a reaction against some primordial element,
but autonomously constitute a mode of thinking that does not follow the rules
of rationality. Paranoid thinking obeys a strict internal logic. It systematizes
the confusion one is confronted with, and produces simulacra about the world
that reveal another side of reality than the one ordinary thought brings to the
fore. Dalí (1930a, 1930b) had articulated these ideas before encountering Lacan
(Roudinesco, 1994; Garrabé, 2005) and it can reasonably be assumed that Dalí
inspired Lacan in stressing the autonomous, non-deduced character of delusional
thinking.4
Second, during a discussion of thought echoes at a conference in 1927,
de Clérambault noted that mental automatism displayed a ‘pejorative tendency’:
usually thought echoes do not express abstract ideas; they are characterized instead
by a ‘crudity of words, ideas and feelings’ (de Clérambault, 1927b, p. 595). This is
an important observation, which appears to contradict the initial belief that
automatic phenomena are athematic and non-ideational. While it might well be
true that mental automatism disrupts an individual’s habitual patterns of ideation,
and triggers ideas that a person had not been thinking of, certain thematic
trends can be observed in what they bring to the fore. Indeed, the cases that
de Clérambault presented across his career demonstrate that automatic phenomena
often express vulgar, aggressive, death-related, or bluntly ironical contents. In his
later papers, de Clérambault noted these contents, but given his non-psychological
approach, he seemed to have been puzzled by them. On the one hand,
de Clérambault pointed out that ‘the psychology of the echo and its derivatives
still needs to be established’ (de Clérambault, 1927b, p. 590), but on the other
hand, he concluded that the pejorative tendency has a neurological origin,
4. Roudinesco (1994, p. 1673) indicates that in 1932–3 Lacan was frequently in touch with Dalí.
They probably first met in 1932 (Garrabé, 2005).
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suggesting that it reflected a neural tendency towards ‘animality.’ Overall,
this explanation seems to point out the limits of his mechanical, organicist
explanations, and precisely at this point Lacan’s structural theory of foreclosure,
which was elaborated in his third Seminar (Lacan, 1993) and in his 1959 paper
‘On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis,’ proves its value. As
I explain below, while underscoring mental automatism qua clinical syndrome,
Lacan went on to make the point that what is at stake in mental automatism is
a typically psychotic position at the level of the unconscious: existential issues,
like sexuality, death, and parenthood, cannot be addressed via lawful principles
articulated by means of the Name-of-the-Father, and as a result, these themes
return in jouissance-laden interruptions. Yet, already in his doctoral thesis Lacan
clearly stated that mental automatism often expresses specific contents (Lacan,
1975[1932]): delusional themes are not secondary in nature, but already present
in the early disruptions of mental life (Maleval, 2001).
Finally, it should also be noted that on several occasions de Clérambault
expressed his discontent with the name given to the syndrome, possibly because
it echoed theories that he wanted to distance himself from. These include
Henri Claude’s (1930) ‘syndrome d’action extérieure,’ which describes similar
problems, but focuses more strongly on the ideas expressed via automatic
phenomena, and Pierre Janet’s (1889) theory of psychological automatism, which
focuses on the non-conscious processing of sensory stimuli (Roudinesco, 1994).
Therefore, in later papers he suggests better alternative names for the syndrome,
including ‘syndrome de passivité’ – passivity syndrome (de Clérambault, 1925,
p. 542; 1926, p. 574); ‘syndrome S’ (de Clérambault, 1927b, p. 588); ‘syndrome
d’écho’ (de Clérambault, 1927b, p. 599); ‘syndrome mécanique’; or ‘syndrome
de Clérambault’ (de Clérambault, 1933, p. 607).5 However, in the later tradition of
psychiatry, mental automatism proved to be the concept that is used most often
to refer to this syndrome.
Lacan and de Clérambault: A History of Love and Hate
As will become clear in this section, the relationship between Lacan and
de Clérambault was quite conflicted. Roudinesco (1993) indicates that during his
psychiatric training Lacan was particularly influenced by three key figures of
French psychiatry: Georges Dumas, a biologically oriented professor of psychiatry
at the Sorbonne; Henri Claude, the chief medical doctor at the Sainte-Anne
psychiatric clinic in Paris, who combined psychodynamic and organic lines of
reasoning concerning psychopathology; and de Clérambault. In his later work,
Lacan stressed that de Clérambault particularly influenced him. In his 1947 paper
‘Presentation on Psychical Causality,’ a critical piece on the work of Henri Ey,
5. In Anglo-Saxon psychiatric literature the name ‘de Clérambault syndrome’ is frequently used
as a synonym of erotomania, which is another syndrome he documented in detail.
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he calls de Clérambault his ‘only master in the observations of patients’ (Lacan,
1947, p. 137), and, as already indicated, in 1966 his ‘only master in psychiatry’
(Lacan, 1966, p. 51). During his Seminar on the psychoses in the mid 1950s he
stated that he was introduced to psychiatry via ‘the intimacy’ of de Clérambault
(Lacan, 1993, p. 5), which suggests a relationship of confidence and friendship,
and near the end of his life he still spoke of him as his good old master
(Roudinesco, 1993, p. 487). However, from the early 1930s until de Clérambault’s
death in 1934 their relationship was troubled.
The first stumbling block between them was a 1931 paper by Lacan on paranoid
psychoses. In this paper – ‘Structures des psychoses paranoïaques’ – Lacan
reviewed subtypes of paranoia, focusing on frequently occurring clinical
characteristics, typical courses of pathology, prognosis, cause, and medico-legal
issues. Qua subtypes he distinguished between an overall paranoid constitution;
delusions of interpretation; and delusions of passion. In reference to de
Clérambault he further subdivided the latter by making a distinction between
delusions of revendication, erotomania, and delusions of jealousy. Within the
paper Lacan referred to the classic works of Kraepelin (mentioned twice),
Sérieux and Capgras (mentioned four times), and to his teachers Claude
(mentioned twice) and de Clérambault (mentioned six times). Indeed,
de Clérambault is the most frequently mentioned authority in this paper, and in
a footnote he pays tribute to him:
this image [the image of the annelid for referring to elementary psychotic phenomena] is
borrowed from the verbal teaching of our master M.G. de Clérambault, to whom we owe
much in terms of matter and method, such that, in order to avoid the risk of plagiarizing
him, we have to pay tribute to him for all the concepts we use. (Lacan, 1988[1931], p. 10)
Yet, by qualifying passionate psychoses as a subtype of paranoia, Lacan actually
joined sides with Claude, contradicting de Clérambault, who clearly distinguished
and juxtaposed both types of psychosis (Maleval, 2001). Moreover, in discussing
mental automatism Lacan used Claude’s (1930) concept ‘syndrome d’action
extérieure,’ which further distanced him from de Clérambault (Maleval, 2001).
The paper infuriated de Clérambault, who publicly attacked Lacan, accusing him
of plagiarism. Lacan was affected by this attack but did not bow to the accusation,
suggesting that the true plagiarist was actually de Clérambault (Leguil, 2002;
Roudinesco, 1993; Rubens, 1998). Obviously, by introducing ideas from Claude
and Freud in his paper, Lacan did not strictly adhere to de Clérambault’s ideas
about paranoia and passionate psychoses (Maleval, 2001). De Clérambault was
himself contemptuous about Henri Claude,6 and demanded strict loyalty from his
followers (Roudineso, 1993), which Lacan did not offer.
6. ‘Everybody in the small world of alienism knows the biting expression de Clérambault used
for his colleague: “there you have a man who wants to make a name with two first names”’
(Rubens, 1998, p. 205).
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From 1930 on, Lacan associated more closely with Claude, who, in 1932,
was the supervisor of his doctoral thesis and had overall academic prestige. He
also involved himself with the surrealist movement that had been attacking
de Clérambault violently from 1928 onwards because of inhumane practices in the
Special Infirmary (Roudinesco, 1994; Rubens, 1998). Moreover, when Lacan
(1988[1931]) published this paper, de Clérambault’s health was deteriorating due
to a cataract, which had a devastating impact on his ability to write.
In 1931 the split became a fact. In another paper, published later in 1931 on the
topic of automatic writing in a case of paranoia (Lévy-Valensi et al., 1931), de
Clérambault is still mentioned since he wrote a diagnostic report about the patient
when she was staying at the Special Infirmary. Yet, his theory of mental
automatism, which actually includes automatic writing (de Clérambault, 1920a), is
not used. By contrast, a strong reference is made to the practice of automatic
writing by surrealist authors such as André Breton. Breton publicly attacked de
Clérambault for his outdated practices in the Special Infirmary, and de
Clérambault, in his turn, denounced the surrealists, qualifying them as dangerous
(Roudinesco, 1994; Rubens, 1998).
De la psychose paranoïaque dans ses rapports avec la personnalité, Lacan’s
(1975[1932]) doctoral thesis, bears further witness to this split. Key points
of reference include Claude, Jaspers, Bleuler, and Kraepelin. Lacan explores
de Clérambault’s contributions to his research topic in only a few paragraphs.
He mentions de Clérambault on paranoia and erotomania, but his work on
mental automatism is referenced only in an early footnote (Lacan, 1975[1932],
p. 25, n.14). This is remarkable considering Lacan discusses the notion of
mental automatism across 14 pages (Lacan, 1975[1932], pp. 126–39), and in the
case study of Aimée different types of interference, such as discreet mental
intrusions and inhibitions, as well as impulses and perplexities are noted as the
basis of her paranoia (e.g. Lacan, 1975[1932], pp. 156, 175–7, 189, 207–17). In
his discussion of mental automatism, Lacan refers to a minor paper by Mignard &
Petit (1912), which does not provide a robust account of the topic.
At a more implicit level, the methodology Lacan (1975[1932]) applies when
discussing the case of Aimée also suggested a rupture with de Clérambault. As
he interviewed people incarcerated at the Special Infirmary de Clérambault had
an objectifying attitude: starting from his personal dogma concerning mental
automatism he examined whether and how automatism occurred. This usually
took one interview, and personal contact with interviewees was limited (Gumpper
& Haustgen, 2012; Rubens, 1998). Thus considered, de Clérambault’s approach
was in tune with Jean-Pierre Falret’s recommendation that in contrast with the
narrative nosographic methods applied by Pinel and Esquirol, an alienist should
not merely listen to people’s stories but actively inquire about elements that point
to delusional functioning (Sauvagnat, 1999). Falret stressed the apodictic saying
that the alienist should not become ‘a secretary to the insane’ (see Sauvagnat,
1999). Lacan, for his part, obviously has an eye for diverse psychotic phenomena
when discussing the case of Aimée, but does not act like a Clérambaultian
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detective. He dynamically situated such phenomena in terms of the challenges
and issues that his patient was confronted with, which sets him in the direction
of psychoanalysis (Vanheule, 2011). Later, when he returned to the subject of
psychosis in his Seminar (1993, p. 206), Lacan further underscored the importance
of such an attitude, saying that ‘becoming a secretary to the insane’ is actually not
such a bad thing: an analyst should not merely inquire about specific psychotic
phenomena but situate them in terms of a person’s overall position with respect
to the symbolic order.
As outlined in the introduction, in his doctoral thesis Lacan introduced
the concept of ‘delusional knowledge’ – connaissance délirante – later called
‘paranoid knowledge.’ With this concept Lacan drew attention to paranoid
patients’ firm delusional understanding of events taking place which, in their
experience, was not a product of their own cognition and imagination but was
revealed automatically from without. This line of reasoning fitted very well with
de Clérambault’s (1920a, 1924b) descriptions of the kind of intrusion proper to
automatic thinking and false recognition. However, Lacan denies this link and
does not cite de Clérambault, though later, in ‘On My Antecedents,’ Lacan (1966)
indeed points out that the roots of his concept are to be found there. It is possible
that his conflicted relation with de Clérambault, his dependence on Claude, and his
search for a psychogenic account of paranoia hindered him from making this
connection explicit at the time (Roudinesco, 1994).7
In 1933, as he published his paper on the murders of the Papin sisters in the
surrealists’ journal Minotaure, Lacan alluded to de Clérambault’s work in the
Special Infirmary, but did not mention him explicitly:
each psychiatrist knows the most special atmosphere that is often evoked by some
stereotype in the patient’s narrative, even before delusional formulations have been made
explicit. If one ever experienced this impression, it makes no wonder that one recognizes
it. Indeed, triage in police services usually builds on this experience. (Lacan, 1933, p. 27)
Soon after de Clérambault’s death in 1934, Lacan again referred to him as his
‘master’ (Leguil, 2002; Maleval, 2001). In 1935 he mentioned de Clérambault’s
theory of mental automatism stressing ‘the beautiful works of this master’ (Lacan,
1935, p. 428). Later on he even seemed to regret that he had actually joined sides
with Claude (and the surrealists): ‘Clérambault was my only master in the
observations of patients, after the very subtle and delectable Trénel, whom I made
the mistake of abandoning too soon, in order to seek a position in the consecrated
spheres of professorial ignorance’ (Lacan, 1947, p. 137). During his third Seminar,
when he discussed psychoses by establishing a dialogue between psychoanalysis,
7. Note that in the preface to his thesis Lacan expressed gratitude to many, but not to Gaëtan
Gatian de Clérambault. For example, he mentions Georges Heuyer, one of de Clérambault’s
collaborators and his successor at the Special Infirmary, but not ‘the master’ himself. Moreover,
de Clérambault’s name is missing when he lists the internships he completed in the preliminaries
of his doctoral thesis (Lacan, 1975[1932], p. 12).
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psychiatry, and structural linguistics, Lacan (1993, pp. 5, 18–19) once again paid
tribute to his master, providing a structural-psychoanalytic reading of his theory
concerning mental automatism.
Mental Automatism, Elementary Phenomena, and Structure
As indicated in the introduction, in 1966 Lacan further rehabilitated de
Clérambault by suggesting a close link between mental automatism and his own
structural approach in psychoanalysis (Haustgen & Gumpper, 2012). Seeing that
Lacan himself did not elaborate on this point in detail, I examine below how this
proposed connection can be understood. Following his structural method I develop
a number of schemas that depict how the mental automatism concept fits with
Lacan’s structural theory of the subject.
In Seminar III, Lacan (1993) not only mentions de Clérambault and mental
automatism quite frequently, but also attributes the concept of ‘elementary
phenomenon’ (phénomène élémentaire) to him (Lacan, 1993, pp. 19, 34). This
is remarkable since de Clérambault does not seem to use this term in writings,
and rather refers to ‘automatic phenomena’ or ‘automatisms’ when talking
about specific manifestations of mental automatism. Lacan uses the concept
‘elementary phenomenon’ from his 1931 paper on schizography onwards, and
in his doctoral thesis he seems to attribute it to Kraepelin rather than to de
Clérambault: ‘Kraepelin describes two kinds of phenomena in psychoses:
elementary disturbance and delusion’ (Lacan, 1975[1932], p. 27). However, as
Trichet (2011) indicates, the concept ‘elementary phenomenon’ actually stems
from the work of the British-French neurologist Benjamin Ball (1880), who uses
it to refer to basic manifestations of psychosis. Ball was the first medical chair
of the Sainte-Anne hospital in Paris, where Lacan completed his psychiatric
training under the supervision of Claude. He probably picked up the concept in
that context. In Lacan’s jargon, the concepts ‘mental automatism’ and ‘elementary
phenomenon’ largely function as synonyms: mental automatism is the elementary
phenomenon of psychosis.
As he discusses elementary phenomena in Seminar III, Lacan questions exactly
what the adjective ‘elementary’ means. Sticking more closely to de Clérambault’s
writings, it could be said that Lacan was criticizing the suggestion that
mental automatism makes up the ‘initial nucleus’ or the ‘nuclear process’ of
psychosis (Lacan, 1993, p. 19). ‘Elementary’ and ‘nuclear’ might imply that these
phenomena are essential or primordial in relation to other psychotic phenomena
that are only ‘secondary’ in nature. This is what de Clérambault indicates
when stating that delusions are interpretations grafted onto elementary phenom-
ena. Such a line of reasoning reflects a process in time: first mental automatism
comes to the fore, and subsequently delusions are formed. In Lacan’s view,
by contrast, ‘elementary’ denotes that the key element of psychosis is expressed:
‘This means that here the notion of element is to be taken in no other way than as
structure, differentiated structure, irreducible to anything other than itself’ (Lacan,
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1993, p. 19). ‘Elementary,’ then, no longer refers to an initial moment, but
to a ‘structural’ point that might be observed across diverse psychotic
phenomena, which is why delusions too are ‘elementary’: just like automatic
phenomena, delusions articulate the structural element that is most characteristic of
psychosis:
elementary phenomena are no more elementary than what underlies the entire
construction of a delusion […] analogous structures can be found at the level of the
composition, motivation, and thematization of a delusion and at the level of the
elementary phenomenon. In other words, it’s always the same structuring force, as it
were, at work in a delusion, whether it’s the whole or one of its parts that is under
consideration. (Lacan, 1993, p. 19)
Within this line of reasoning the idea of structure is crucial. In the 1950s Lacan
was heavily influenced by the structuralist turn in the human and social sciences
(e.g. Milner, 2002), which generally aimed to grasp the logical organization of
given phenomena by mapping the relations between their constituent elements.
In Seminar III, Lacan defined structure as ‘a group of elements forming a covariant
set […] A structure is always established by referring something coherent to
something else, which is complementary to it’ (Lacan, 1993, p. 183). Within this
logic, structure implies dependency between elements. In a group consisting of
the elements A, B, and C structural relations are established if, for example,
changes in A imply changes in B, which might further be influenced by what
happens at the level of C. In this case, the elements A, B, and C make up a set,
meaning that between these elements decisive relations are established.
What is crucial to Lacan’s understanding of structure in the 1950s is that he
connects it to the signifier: ‘the notion of structure is by itself already a
manifestation of the signifier […] when we analyze a structure it’s always at
least ideally a question of the signifier’ (Lacan, 1993, pp. 183–4). When Lacan
(1988[1931]) wrote about structure in the 1930s this was not yet linked to
structuralist thinking or to the role of language in mental life. Indeed, in Seminar
III, when analyzing elementary phenomena, Lacan thinks of these as manifes-
tations at the level of the chain of signifiers, which is also true for neurotic
symptoms. The underlying idea is that the mental continuity that we normally
experience is determined by the sets of signifiers we use. Our private mental
world, which consists of webs of ideas or signifieds, is coherent because we
classify and name things and events that might possibly occur by means of
signifiers. These enable us to experience regularities.
What is also characteristic of the signifying chain is that it enables anticipation
and retroaction (see Lacan, 1957, 1960). Anticipation means that starting from
one signifier I expect the occurrence of others. Indeed, as we speak, a set of
expectations with respect to different probabilities is triggered, which installs
the dimension of future experience: through anticipation, a number of expected
signifying articulations are created mentally. Retroaction, in its turn, means that as
the signifiers unfold, they affect the meaning associated with previously articulated
STIJN VANHEULE 219
elements of the signifying chain. Established ideas that were constituted via a
previous set of signifiers might be underscored, challenged, or grow to be more
complex when new signifiers are added to the earlier set.
Importantly, Lacanian theory not only attributes a meaning-generating function
to anticipation and retroaction. Signifying articulation also generates the
dimension of the subject (Fink, 1995; Vanheule, 2011). Via speech I present
myself for myself and in relation to others. Speech entails an enunciating position
through the articulation of signifiers. However, and crucially, this enunciating
position is never fully or adequately represented by any of the signifiers I use
(Feyaerts & Vanheule, 2015). On the one hand, articulations of the signifying
chain produce an enunciated subject: through retroaction I establish ideas
concerning my identity in relation to the identity of others. Yet, these ideas
never make up a whole and can contain contradiction, which is one reason why the
subject is conceptualized as divided in Lacanian theory. On the other hand, our use
of speech entails an enunciating subject. This means that all effort towards
representation inherently blunders. In speech, while I might seem to cohere with
what I have said, this is never the case: the saying never coheres with the said,
which implies that the enunciating act as such actualizes the non-enunciated side
of the subject. Therefore, the subject is not a fixed entity, but has an evanescent
event-like character: in the tilting movement between signifiers the subject fades
the moment it is named.
Mental Automatism Considered Structurally
In terms of these elements from Lacan’s structural theory, mental automatism
might be conceptualized as an unanticipated interference in the signifying
chain. Whereas de Clérambault differentiates between different functional
domains through which automatic phenomena are expressed (ideo-verbal,
motor, sensory-affective), Lacan’s focus is more abstract, concentrating on the
logical organization of the interference that takes place. For example, in ‘On a
Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis,’ when criticizing
the psychiatric approach to hallucinations Lacan remarked the following:
Clinicians did better when they figured out that verbal motor hallucinations are often
accompanied by the subject’s own partial phonatory movements. Yet they did not
articulate the crucial point, which is that, since the sensorium is indifferent in the
production of a signifying chain:
(a) the signifying chain imposes itself, by itself, on the subject in its dimension as voice;
(b) it takes on, as such, a reality proportionate to the time, which is perfectly observable
in experience, involved in its subjective attribution;
(c) and its own structure, qua signifier, is determinant in this attribution, which is
distributive as a rule – that is, it has several voices and thus renders equivocal the
supposedly unifying percipiens. (Lacan, 1959, p. 447)
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In his view the specific functional domain, or sensorial register
(sensorium), affected in a hallucination is subordinate to the signifying process
along which it is constituted: signifiers are imposed automatically onto the
subject (component (a) from the quote); imposed signifiers disrupt the
process of retroaction (and become more irrefutable the longer the initial
bewilderment) (component (b)); and, as a result, the subject itself, which is an
effect of the signifying articulation, is challenged and rendered ambiguous
(component (c)).
While Lacan does not explicitly apply this line of structural reasoning to de
Clérambault’s mental automatism, both are compatible, as he suggests in ‘On My
Antecedents.’
Specifically, it might be argued that in positive automatic phenomena the
course of anticipation and retroaction is disrupted because of the spontaneous
occurrence of unanticipated parasitic signifiers that do not fit the line of signifiers
along which the subject is constituted. These disrupt the coherence of the set
of signifiers that one was actually using when making sense of the world. Given
this missing coherence, no meaningful signifieds can be connected to such
parasitic signifiers: retroactive movement fails to connect parasitic signifiers to
other elements in the signifying chain, and therefore deeply disturb subjectivity.
They confront the subject with a nonsensical element that cannot be attributed
to an enunciating subject (‘I’m not the originator of this thought/utterance/
action/feeling/perception’; ‘it’s not me, it happens in/to me’). This is exactly what
gives them their peculiar epistemic status: because these parasitic signifiers cannot
be attributed to an enunciating subject, they constitute an imposed body of
knowledge, paranoid knowledge, which cannot be questioned. Unlike productions
of the unconscious in neurosis, elementary phenomena are not experienced
as expressions of one’s own subjectivity. Productions of the unconscious
in neurosis provoke surprise: displaced signifiers appear in unexpected contexts
and, to paraphrase Freud (1919), provoke the feeling that one is not the master
in one’s own house. The emergence of positive elementary phenomena, by
contrast, is accompanied by perplexity and dismay. They are manifestations
of unthinkable or unimaginable signifiers, with which one, at least initially,
feels no link. However, given that such invading signifiers interfere within
the signifying chain that constitutes the subject, they cannot simply be put
aside, and they affect the enunciated subject (‘this thought/utterance/
action/feeling/perception concerns me’). By the imposition of a strange element
in the midst of how the subject approaches the world, such parasitic signifiers
undermine the identity he experiences both of himself and of others. To use
Freud’s metaphor, they destabilize the idea of having a safe haven that protects
against the world outside. Elementary phenomena are bombs that (threaten to)
make the house explode.
Paranoid knowledge cannot simply be integrated in the retroactive
(meaning-generating) movement of the signifying chain, which not so much
effaces the subject, but fundamentally questions whether it is still the subject
STIJN VANHEULE 221
who is speaking, challenging whether one is a subject at all, or an object
subjected to external intentions. Indeed, when confusion at that point is replaced
by a verdict, delusional activity starts: changes at the level of the enunciated
subject are not attributed to an enunciating subject, but to an uncontrollable
other one is merely subjected to. As already indicated, in Lacan’s view
delusions reiterate the pivotal point of interruption that also comes to the fore
in elementary phenomena. Therefore, they should not be seen as interpretations,
but as variations on the same structural point; that is, the point of rupture in the
intimacy of life.
Negative automatic phenomena, in their turn, can be conceptualized as a radical
rupture in the continuous unfolding of the chain of signifiers. Signifying
articulation itself gets inhibited and blocked, and, as a result, anticipation in
particular is undermined. What is lost in negative automatic phenomena is
the materiality of the signifier itself. At the place where a signifier is expected
to occur, given the trajectory of the signifying chain, desolate emptiness
awaits, which, moreover, does not refer to anything (‘my thought/utterance/
action/feeling/perception is disappearing’). The basic element upon which
expectation builds is absent, and thus the end point of the utterance brings
nothing but perplexity. Given this desolate emptiness, the meaning attributed
to past and future events fails to be constituted. In this case, retroaction fails
radically. To further rephrase Freud: in the case of negative elementary phenomena
the house does not explode; it implodes. Indeed, the elementary absence
of signifiers implies the disappearance of an enunciating subject and radically
deters the creation of an enunciated subject. In this case, the divided subject
simply fails to constitute itself. What remains is numb hollowness, and the loss of
the ability to experience oneself as a continuity in space and time: the dimension
of the divided subject, which appears as an undercurrent of signifying articulation,
is annulled.
In terms of Lacan’s structural theory from the 1950s, mental automatism
concerns a functional-formal disruption that creates ambiguity and discontinuity in
the signifying chain, which destabilizes the experience of the subject. It implies an
estrangement in the process of thinking and feeling. The no doubt illusory, but
constitutive, feeling of being the agent and owner of mental processes and of
bodily experiences is lost.
Thus considered we can indeed conclude that, while in contrast with de
Clérambault, Lacan does not discuss mental automatism in terms of specific
functional domains, the process of disruption that de Clérambault describes is
compatible with Lacan’s structural approach from the 1950s, where elementary
phenomena are events in the signifying chain that destabilize the subject. In terms
of Lacan’s distinction between the registers of the Real, the Symbolic, and the
Imaginary, these are disruptions of the Real at the level of the Symbolic order.
Order is lost, Symbolic disorder comes to the fore, and this threatens the subject
since the material basis through which the subject is articulated (i.e. the chain of
signifiers) is undermined.
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From Causation to Determination
Notwithstanding their structural compatibility, de Clérambault and Lacan
frame mental automatism in rather different ways. Already in his doctoral thesis
Lacan disagreed with de Clérambault’s idea that elementary phenomena have
an organic origin only, instead suggesting that they are evoked in relation to
the other (Lacan, 1975[1932], pp. 211–17). For example, in his case study of
Aimée he pointed out that ‘vital situations’ and ‘moral conflicts’ concerning
her position towards her child, her sister, and her husband had a disturbing effect
and triggered disturbances of the mental automatism type (Lacan, 1975[1932],
p. 261).
In Seminar III Lacan further elaborated this idea, suggesting that ‘the fertile
moment’ of triggering a psychotic episode comprises ‘an emotional element in the
subject’s life, a crisis that in fact does involve his external relationships’ (Lacan,
1993, pp. 17–18). However, what is crucial to Lacan’s line of reasoning is that he
relates the triggering of mental automatism to the confrontation with a radical
failure or foreclosure in representing oneself via the signifier in relation to
questions occurring at the level of the unconscious.
In this context, the subject is confronted with questions related to existence at
the level of the unconscious. In line with the Nietzschean dictum that man is a sick
animal, Lacan assumed that human functioning was only partly determined by
biology or by environmental factors. His work on the mirror stage and the double
mirror model made this clear (Lacan, 1949, 1961): natural maturation and
instinctual patterns do not completely govern who we are, thus leaving us, at the
level of being, with an unpleasurable need, called the lack-of-being or want-to-be
(manque-à-être). Such ‘organic discord,’ wrote Lacan (1959, p. 461), necessitates
a ‘symbiosis with the Symbolic.’ Indeed, in dealing with the Unbehagen, at the
level of being, we use signifiers, and can live in terms of what culture and social
contexts define as good ways of living. Thanks to our so-called symbiosis with the
Symbolic, the precarious lack-of-being is turned into an articulated question of
existence. Henceforth self-directed epistemic questions (‘who am I?’) and
questions concerning the intentionality of the other (‘what do you want?’) make
up the unconscious.
More specifically, in his 1959 paper on psychosis, Lacan pointed out that the
unconscious is organized around a set of existence-related questions or dilemmas,
which no signifiers can settle once and for all. These concern one’s position with
respect to parenthood and authority; life in the light of death; sexuality in relation
to love and procreation; and sexuation, that is: the question as to whether, or how,
one is a man or a woman (Lacan, 1959, pp. 461, 464). Daily life confronts us with
these issues, and while no signifier can conclusively determine our identity, the
stories we tell and the thoughts we have bear witness to the human attempt to
resolve the vacillating position we occupy at the level of existence. What is more,
this vacillation, as brought to the fore in our use of the signifier vis-à-vis questions
related to existence, determines the subject.
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In ‘On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis’ Lacan (1959)
differentiated psychosis and neurosis as two modes of dealing with questions of
existence, which have direct implications for how the occurrence of elementary
phenomena are determined. He argued that in neurosis the question pertaining to
the intentionality of the other is addressed in terms of a lawful principle, which is
presumed at the basis of the other’s actions. In this clinical structure the subject
takes shape through the belief that the other’s actions are not random, but guided
by meaningful principles: social and cultural laws determine what the other does,
or should do. Lacan (1959) called this lawful principle the ‘Name-of-the-Father.’
What is more, by means of subsequent identifications that further attune the
subject to the other’s desire, self-directed epistemic questions (‘who am I?’) also
obtain an answer. In psychosis, by contrast, the Name-of-the-Father is radically
missing or foreclosed. No answer is created either for questions concerning the
intentionality of the other or for self-directed epistemic questions, and as a result
the experience of the subject is unstable.
What then determines the occurrence of elementary phenomena? They emerge
in relation to the other when specific life-events provoke questions related to
existence, but no support can be found in a Name-of-the-Father. In other words,
the appeal to position oneself is made qua event, but no support is found in any
signifier at all, and this produces an interruption in the signifying chain. At that
point two possibilities come to the fore. Either one ends up in confusion, as the
breach in the signifying chain is presented in all its rudeness. In that case the
signifying chain dies out, resulting in negative mental automatism. The other
possibility is that instead of dying out the signifying chain starts to function in
uncontrolled ways, and alternative signifiers are produced in the reality of the
subject, which results in positive mental automatism.
Indeed the hypothesis underlying Lacan’s model is that confrontations with the
foreclosure of a Name-of-the-Father determine mental automatism. Clinically
speaking this implies that upon detecting elementary phenomena in a patient’s
discourse, the psychoanalyst needs to construct, through case formulation, how
mental automatism might be associated to specific events of failure – failure to
represent oneself by means of the signifier in relation to the other.
An added value of the Lacanian account of mental automatism is that it enables
us to grasp why phenomena of mental automatism touch on specific contents.
Foreclosure implies that specific issues concerning sexuality, death, relationships,
and human intentionality cannot be addressed in lawful terms, and as a result
they are expressed in a Real way through automatic phenomena, which manifest in
wild, unexpected, and brutal ways, and confront the subject with contents
that cannot be assumed by means of a Name-of-the-Father. Hence, for example,
Judge Schreber’s daydream that it must be beautiful to be a woman making love,
which is an automatically imposed thought he, at least at first, cannot make sense
of. The thought occurs at the moment he is notified about his appointment
as Senatspräsident. This constitutes an appeal to assert his masculinity, which
collapses, and suddenly a feminizing thought overwhelms him. Another example
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can be found in the case of Aimée: she fails to occupy a mothering position in
relation to her son, and suddenly it comes to her mind that people want to hurt her
baby. Indeed, what Lacan leaves aside are de Clérambault’s causal explanations,
replacing these with a focus on unconscious determination.
Conclusion
Starting from a general introduction on Gaëtan Gatian de Clérambault, and in
particular his concept of mental automatism, this article examined two ideas from
Lacan’s ‘On My Antecedents.’ First I explored the connection between Lacan’s
concept ‘paranoiac knowledge’ and de Clérambault’s ‘mental automatism’ in
order to clarify why Lacan initially neglected the obvious connection between
these concepts in his early work. A loyalty to Henri Claude appears to have been
the main factor here. Next I examined Lacan’s suggestion that de Clérambault’s
concept of mental automatism closely matched with his own structural approach
to psychoanalysis, something that Lacan himself never demonstrated. I argued
that from a structural perspective mental automatism comes down to a rupture in
the continuity of the signifying chain, which provokes the disappearance of the
subject. Negative mental automatism coheres with the occurrence of a gap in the
chain of signifiers, and positive mental automatism coheres with the occurrence of
unanticipated signifiers. Furthermore, I pointed out that Lacan’s theory implies the
hypothesis that manifestations of mental automatism are determined by a so-called
foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father in psychosis, whereby questions related to
existence cannot be addressed by means of the signifying chain. Mental
automatism attests to this. What is interesting about the link with Lacan’s theory
of foreclosure is that it enables us to explain why specific contents come to the fore
in mental automatism.
Interestingly, the focus of this paper has implications for contemporary theory in
the field of Lacanian psychoanalysis. In recent years Lacanian psychoanalysts
developed a strong interest in ‘ordinary psychosis’ or ‘cold psychosis’: modes of
subjective functioning that are not characterized by obvious hallucinations or
delusions, but that nonetheless bear witness to psychosis (Miller, 2009; Leader,
2011; Redmond, 2014). In reference to Lacan’s (1959) text ‘On a Question Prior to
Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis,’ Miller suggests that above all ordinary
psychosis is characterized by a disturbed self-experience consisting of the feeling
that something is fundamentally wrong in life; an experience of ‘a disturbance that
occurs at the inmost juncture of the subject’s sense of life’ (Miller, 2009, p. 154).
This disturbance is typically expressed in a feeling of externality or disconnection
that manifests ‘in the way you feel the surrounding world, in the way you feel your
own body, and in the way you relate to you own ideas’ (Miller, 2009, p. 154).
Specifically, Miller (in IRMA, 1999, p. 290) suggests that such feeling of
externality or disconnection might best be framed in terms of mental automatism.
However, he does not elaborate how de Clérambault’s concept fits with the
Lacanian framework. The same is true for other authors working on this topic
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(Leader, 2011; Redmond, 2014). Hence the usefulness of establishing parallels
and divergences between de Clérambault’s mental automatism and Lacan’s
structural concept of psychosis.
Finally, this paper leaves several questions unaddressed. One point that deserves
further study is how Lacan uses the concept of automatism in his discussion
of Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle, as well as Aristotle’s concepts tuché
and automaton (Lacan, 1964; Verhaeghe, 2002). Both discussions are relevant
in terms of de Clérambault’s theory of mental automatism (Tevissen, 2008).
Moreover, exactly how Lacan’s weekly clinical case presentations, which
he framed as actual analytic work (Miller, 1978), imply a turn away from de
Clérambault’s expertise-driven interviewing style should also be addressed
(Haustgen & Gumpper, 2012).
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ABSTRACT
In 1966, in a paper on those who have influenced his work, Jacques Lacan suggested that his
concept of ‘paranoid knowledge’ and his structural approach to psychoanalysis were closely
linked to the work of Gaëtan Gatian de Clérambault. This article examines both of these
points. Starting with an introduction to de Clérambault, focusing on his concept ‘mental
automatism,’ the link between ‘mental automatism’ and ‘paranoid knowledge’ is discussed.
Loyalty to Henri Claude and conflicts around theoretical and clinical issues seem to lie at
the basis of Lacan’s initial neglect of his conceptual indebtedness to de Clérambault.
Second, the author discusses the presumed connection between mental automatism and
Lacan’s structural psychoanalytic theory, which Lacan did not elaborate. It is argued that
from a structural perspective, mental automatism comes down to a rupture in the continuity
of the signifying chain, which provokes the disappearance of the subject. Furthermore,
Lacan’s theory implies the hypothesis that manifestations of mental automatism are
determined by a foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father, where questions related to existence
cannot be addressed in a stable way. Lacanian theory thus retained de Clérambault’s notion
of a rupture in mental life that lies at the basis of psychosis, but replaced his biological
framework with the dimension of the subject as produced through speech.
Key words: psychosis, psychoanalysis, paranoia, hallucinations, delusions, subject, Lacan,
mental automatism, de Clérambault
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